Implementing CSR-contingent Executive Compensation
商品編號：W31864
出版日期：2022/10/25
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商品主題：General Management/Strategy
商品類型：Article
涵蓋議題：CSR-contingent Executive Compensation, Executive pay, Governing ESG, Corporate social responsibility
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內容長度：3 頁
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Forward-looking firms have been linking executive compensation to corporate social responsibility (CSR) for years. Research has identified two common types of CSR-contingent compensation contracts. Some firms take a formulistic or objective approach in which executives know in advance how much they can expect to gain by pursuing specified CSR-related activities, while other firms take a more subjective approach in which CSR-contingent compensation is subject to the discretion of compensation committees ex post. Implementing either approach can improve a firm’s CSR ratings. But the pros and cons differ depending on a firm’s industry, growth prospects, and earnings volatility. The subjective approach can be more efficient when, for example, firms are high-tech, risky, young, or fast-growing; are highly visible and facing more public scrutiny; or are implementing new, unconventional CSR projects. On the other hand, the objective approach may make more sense when firms are traditional or mature; are implementing conventional CSR projects or continuing existing CSR projects (so the target is clear and measurable); are expecting stable and predictable project outcomes; or are experiencing poor CSR standings. All firms can try taking a conservative, objective approach to gain experience designing a reward and evaluation system, and then move to a more subjective contract if it makes sense to do so.
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